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Abstract. We initiate the study of two-party cryptographic primitives with unconditional
security, assuming that the adversary’s quantum memory is of bounded size. We show that oblivious
transfer and bit commitment can be implemented in this model using protocols where honest parties
need no quantum memory, whereas an adversarial player needs quantum memory of size at least n/2
in order to break the protocol, where n is the number of qubits transmitted. This is in sharp contrast
to the classical bounded-memory model, where we can only tolerate adversaries with memory of size
quadratic in honest players’ memory size. Our protocols are efficient and noninteractive and can be
implemented using today’s technology. On the technical side, a new entropic uncertainty relation
involving min-entropy is established.
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1. Introduction. It is well known that nontrivial two-party cryptographic prim-
itives cannot be securely implemented if only error-free communication is available
and there is no limitation assumed on the computing power and memory of the play-
ers. Fundamental examples of such primitives are bit commitment (BC) and oblivious
transfer (OT). In BC, a committer C commits himself to a choice of a bit b by ex-
changing information with a verifier V. We want that V does not learn b (we say the
commitment is hiding), yet C can later choose to reveal b in a convincing way; i.e.,
only the value fixed at commitment time will be accepted by V (we say the commit-
ment is binding). In (Rabin) OT, a sender S sends a bit b to a receiver R by executing
some protocol in such a way that R receives b with probability 12 and nothing with
probability 12 , yet S does not learn what was received.
Informally, BC is not possible with unconditional security since hiding means that
when 0 is committed, exactly the same information exchange could have happened
when committing to a 1. Hence, even if 0 was actually committed to, C could always
compute a complete view of the protocol consistent with having committed to 1, and
pretend that this was what he had in mind originally. A similar type of argument
shows that OT is also impossible in this setting.
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One might hope that allowing the protocol to make use of quantum communica-
tion would make a difference. Here, information is stored in qubits, i.e., in the state
of two-level quantum mechanical systems, such as the polarization state of a single
photon. It is well known that quantum information behaves in a way that is funda-
mentally different from classical information, enabling, for instance, unconditionally
secure key exchange between two honest players. However, in the case of two mutu-
ally distrusting parties, we are not so fortunate: even with quantum communication,
unconditionally secure BC and OT remain impossible [31, 34].
There are, however, several scenarios where these impossibility results do not
apply, namely:
(i) if the computing power of players is bounded,
(ii) if the communication is noisy,
(iii) if the adversary is under some physical limitation, e.g., the size of the avail-
able memory is bounded.
The first scenario is the basis of many well-known solutions based on plausible
but unproven complexity assumptions, such as hardness of factoring or discrete loga-
rithms. The second scenario has been used to construct both BC and OT protocols in
various models for the noise [13, 15, 14]. The third scenario is our focus here. In this
model, OT and BC can be done using classical communication, assuming, however,
quite restrictive bounds on the adversary’s memory size [10, 19]; namely, it can be at
most quadratic in the memory size of honest players. Such an assumption is on the
edge of being realistic; it would clearly be more satisfactory to have a larger separation
between the memory size of honest players and that of the adversary. However, this
was shown to be impossible [22].
In this paper, we study for the first time what happens if instead we consider
protocols where quantum communication is used and we place a bound on the adver-
sary’s quantum memory size. There are two reasons why this may be a good idea:
first, if we do not bound the classical memory size, we avoid the impossibility result
of [22]. Second, the adversary’s typical goal is to obtain a certain piece of classical
information that we want to keep hidden from him. However, if he cannot store all
the quantum information that is sent, he must convert some of it to classical informa-
tion by measuring. This may irreversibly destroy information, and we may be able to
arrange it such that the adversary cannot afford to lose information this way, while
honest players can.
It turns out that this is indeed possible: we present protocols for both BC and OT
in which n qubits are transmitted, where honest players need no quantum memory,
but where the adversary must store at least n/2 qubits to break the protocol. We
emphasize that no bound is assumed on the adversary’s computing power, nor on his
classical memory. This is clearly much more satisfactory than the classical case, not
only from a theoretical point of view, but also in practice: while sending qubits and
measuring them immediately as they arrive is well within reach of current technol-
ogy, storing even a single qubit for more than a fraction of a second is a formidable
technological challenge. Furthermore, we show that our protocols also work in a non-
ideal setting where we allow the quantum source to be imperfect and the quantum
communication to be noisy.
We emphasize that what makes OT and BC possible in our model is not so
much the memory bound per se, but rather the loss of information on the part of the
adversary. Indeed, our results also hold if the adversary’s memory device holds an
arbitrary number of qubits but is imperfect in certain ways. This is discussed in more
detail in section 6.2.
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Our protocols are noninteractive; only one party sends information when doing
OT, commitment, or opening. Furthermore, the commitment protocol has the in-
teresting property that the only message is sent to the committer; i.e., it is possible
to commit while only receiving information. Such a scheme clearly does not exist
without a bound on the committer’s memory, even under computational assumptions
and using quantum communication: a corrupt committer could always store (possi-
bly quantumly) all the information sent, until opening time, and only then follow the
honest committer’s algorithm to figure out what should be sent to convincingly open
a 0 or a 1. Note that in the classical bounded-storage model, it is known how to do
time-stamping that is noninteractive in our sense: a player can time-stamp a docu-
ment while only receiving information [35]. However, no reasonable BC or protocol
that time-stamps a bit exists in this model. It is straightforward to see that any such
protocol can be broken by an adversary with classical memory of size twice that of
an honest player, while our protocol requires no memory for the honest players and
remains secure against any adversary unable to store more than half the size of the
quantum transmission.
We also note that it has been shown earlier that BC is possible using quantum
communication, assuming a different type of physical limitation, namely, a bound on
the size of coherent measurement that can be implemented [39]. This limitation is
incomparable to ours: it does not limit the total size of the memory; instead it limits
the number of bits that can be simultaneously operated on to produce a classical
result. Our adversary has a limit on the total memory size, but can measure all of it
coherently. The protocol from [39] is interactive and requires a bound on the maximal
measurement size that is sublinear in n.
On the technical side, we derive a new type of uncertainty relation involving the
min-entropy of a quantum encoding (see Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3), which might
be useful in other contexts as well. The new relation is then used in combination with
a proof technique by Shor and Preskill [41], where the actions of honest players are
purified, and with privacy amplification against quantum adversaries as introduced
by Renner and Ko¨nig [37, 36].
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Notation and terminology. For a set I = {i1, i2, . . . , i} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
and an n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, we define x|I := xi1xi2 · · ·xi , and we write Bδn(x)
for the set of all n-bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from x. Note that the
number of elements in Bδn(x) is the same for all x; we denote it by Bδn := |Bδn(x)|.
It is well known that Bδn ≤ 2nh(δ), where h(p) denotes the binary entropy function
h(p) := −(p · log p+(1−p) · log (1− p)). All logarithms in this paper are to base two.
We denote by negl(n) any function of n smaller than any polynomial provided that
n is sufficiently large.
For a discrete probability space (Ω, P ), we write P [E ] for the probability of the
event E ⊂ Ω, and we write PX for the distribution of the random variable X :
Ω → X . We use similar notation for conditional probabilities and distributions. As is
common practice, we do not refer to the probability space (Ω, P ) but leave it implicitly
defined by the joint probabilities of all considered events and random variables. For
a probability distribution Q over X , we abbreviate the (overall) probability of a set
L ⊆ X with Q(L) :=∑x∈LQ(x).
The pair {|0〉, |1〉} denotes the computational or rectilinear or “+” basis for the
two-dimensional complex Hilbert space C2. The diagonal or “×” basis is defined as
{|0〉×, |1〉×}, where |0〉× = 1√2 (|0〉+|1〉) and |1〉× = 1√2 (|0〉−|1〉). Measuring a qubit in
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the + -basis (resp., ×-basis) means applying the measurement described by projectors
|0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| (resp., projectors |0〉×〈0|× and |1〉×〈1|×). When the context requires
it, we write |0〉+ and |1〉+ instead of |0〉 and |1〉, respectively, and for any x ∈ {0, 1}n
and r ∈ {+,×}, we write |x〉r =
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉r. If we want to choose the +- or ×-basis
according to the bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we write {+,×}[b].
The behavior of a quantum state in a register E is fully described by its density
matrix ρE. We often consider cases where a quantum state may depend on some
classical random variable X, in that it is described by the density matrix ρxE if and
only if X = x. For an observer who has access only to the register E but not to X,
the behavior of the state is determined by the density matrix
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E. The joint
state, consisting of the classical X and the quantum register E and therefore called
a cq-state, is described by the density matrix
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE. In order to have
more compact expressions, we use the following notation. We write
ρXE =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE = trX(ρXE) =
∑
x
PX(x)ρ
x
E .
More generally, for any event E , we write
(2.1) ρXE|E =
∑
x
PX|E(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE|E = trX(ρXE|E) =
∑
x
PX|E(x)ρxE.
We also write ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| for the quantum representation of the classi-
cal random variable X (and similarly for ρX|E). This notation extends naturally to
quantum states that depend on several classical random variables (i.e., to ccq-states,
etc.).
This notation extends naturally to quantum states that depend on several classical
random variables (i.e., to ccq-states, etc.), defining the density matrices ρXY E, ρXY E|E ,
ρY E|X=x, etc. We tend to slightly abuse notation and write ρxY E = ρXE|X=x and
ρxY E|E = ρY E|X=x,E , as well as ρ
x
E = trY (ρ
x
Y E) and ρ
x
E|E = trY (ρ
x
Y E|E).
1 Note that
writing ρXE = trY (ρXY E) and ρE = trX,Y (ρXY E) is consistent with the above notation.
We also write ρXE|E = trY (ρXY E|E) and ρE|E = trX,Y (ρXY E|E), where one has to be
aware that in contrast to (2.1), here the state E may depend on the event E when
given x (namely, via Y ), so that, e.g., ρE|E =
∑
x PX|E(x)ρ
x
E|E .
Given a cq-state ρXE, by saying that there exists a random variable Y such
that ρXY E satisfies some condition, we mean that ρXE can be understood as ρXE =
trY (ρXY E) for a ccq-state ρXY E that satisfies the required condition.
Obviously, ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE if and only if the quantum part is independent of X
(in that ρxE = ρE for any x), where the latter in particular implies that no information
on X can be learned by observing only ρE. Furthermore, if ρXE and ρX ⊗ ρE are
ε-close in terms of their trace distance δ(ρ, σ) = 12 tr(|ρ − σ|), then the real system
ρXE “behaves” as the ideal system ρX ⊗ ρE except with probability ε [37] in that for
any evolution of the system no observer can distinguish the real system from the ideal
one with advantage greater than ε. Throughout the paper, 1 stands for the identity
matrix (describing the fully mixed state) renormalized by the appropriate dimension.
We consider the notion of the classical Re´nyi entropy Hα(X) of order α of a
random variable X [38], as well as its generalization to the Re´nyi entropy Hα(ρ) of
1The density matrix ρxE|E describes the quantum state E in the case that the event E occurs and X
takes on the value x. The corresponding convention holds for the other density matrices considered
here.
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a quantum state ρ [37]. It holds that Hα(ρX) = Hα(X) and Hα(ρX) ≤ Hβ(ρX) if
α ≥ β. The cases that are relevant for us are the classical min-entropy H∞(X) =
− log (maxx PX(x)) as well as the quantum versions of the max- and collision-entropy
H0(ρ) = log (rank(ρ)), respectively, H2(ρ) = − log
(∑
i λ
2
i
)
, where {λi}i are the eigen-
values of ρ.
2.2. Bounded quantum storage and privacy amplification. All our pro-
tocols take place in the bounded-quantum-storage model, which concretely means the
following: the state of an adversarial player may consist of an arbitrary number of
qubits, and he may perform arbitrary quantum computation. At a certain point in
time, though, we say that the memory bound applies, which means that a measure-
ment is applied to the system with the restriction that the resulting quantum state
can be stored in at most q qubits. The classical outcome of the measurement can be of
arbitrary size and (classically) stored for later use. After this point, the player is again
unbounded in (quantum) memory. Throughout, the adversary may have unbounded
computing power and classical memory. We note that our results also apply to some
cases where the adversary’s memory is not bounded but is noisy in certain ways; see
section 6.2.
An important tool we use is universal hashing. A class Fn of hashing functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1} is called two-universal if for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with x = y,
and F uniformly chosen from Fn,
P
[
F (x) = F (y)
] ≤ 1
2
.
Several two-universal classes of hashing functions are such that evaluating and picking
a function uniformly and at random in Fn can be done efficiently [11, 42].
Theorem 2.1 (see [37]). Let ρXE be a cq-state, where X is distributed over
{0, 1}n and register E contains q qubits. Let F be the random variable corresponding
to the random choice (with uniform distribution and independent from X) of a member
of a two-universal class of hashing functions Fn. Then
δ
(
ρF (X)FE,1⊗ ρFE
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2 (H2(ρXE)−H0(ρE)−1)(2.2)
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2 (H∞(X)−q−1).(2.3)
The first inequality (2.2) is the original theorem from [37], and (2.3) follows by
observing that H2(ρXE) ≥ H2(ρX) = H2(X) ≥ H∞(X). In this paper, we use only
this weaker version of the theorem.
Note that if the rightmost term of (2.3) is negligible, i.e., say, smaller than 2−εn,
then this situation is 2−εn-close to the ideal situation where F (X) is perfectly uni-
form and independent of E and F . In particular, replacing F (X) by an independent
and uniformly distributed bit results in a common state which essentially cannot be
distinguished from the original one.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1. In section 5, this
lemma will be useful for proving the binding condition of our commitment scheme.
Recall that for X ∈ {0, 1}n, Bδn(X) denotes the set of all n-bit strings at Hamming
distance at most δn from X and Bδn := |Bδn(X)| is the number of such strings.
Lemma 2.2. Let ρXE be a cq-state, where X is distributed over {0, 1}n and
register E contains q qubits. Let Xˆ be a guess for X obtained by measuring E. Then,
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for all δ < 12 it holds that
P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X)−q−1)+log(Bδn).
In other words, given a quantum memory of q qubits arbitrarily correlated with
a classical random variable X, the probability of finding Xˆ at Hamming distance at
most δn from X, where nh(δ) < 12 (H∞(X)− q), is negligible.
Proof. Here is a strategy to try to bias F (X) when given Xˆ and F ∈R Fn.
Sample X ′ ∈R Bδn(Xˆ) and output F (X ′). Note that, using psucc as shorthand for
the probability P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] to be bounded,
P
[
F (X ′) = F (X)
]
=
psucc
Bδn
+
(
1− psucc
Bδn
)
1
2
=
1
2
+
psucc
2 · Bδn ,
where the first equality follows from the fact that if X ′ = X, then, as Fn is two-
universal, P [F (X) = F (X ′)] = 12 . Note that, given F and being allowed to measure
E, the probability of correctly guessing a binary F (X) is upper bounded by 12 +
δ(ρF (X)FE,1⊗ ρFE) [24]. In combination with Theorem 2.1, the above results in
1
2
+
psucc
2 · Bδn ≤
1
2
+
1
2
2−
1
2 (H∞(X)−q−1),
and the claim follows immediately.
2.3. Operators and norms. For a linear operator A on the complex Hilbert
space H, we define the operator norm
‖A‖ := sup
〈 x| x〉=1
‖Ax‖
for the Euclidean norm ‖x‖ :=√〈x|x〉. When A is Hermitian, we have
‖A‖ = λmax(A) := max{|λj | : λj an eigenvalue of A}.
From an equivalent definition of the norm ‖A‖ = sup〈y|y〉=〈x|x〉=1 |〈y|A|x〉|, it is easy
to see that ‖A∗‖ = ‖A‖. For two Hermitian matrices A and B, we have that ‖AB‖ =
‖(AB)∗‖ = ‖B∗A∗‖ = ‖BA‖. The operator norm is unitarily invariant ; i.e., for all
unitary U, V , ‖A‖ = ‖UAV ‖ holds. It is easy to show that
∥∥∥∥
(
A 0
0 B
)∥∥∥∥ = max {‖A‖, ‖B‖} .
Lemma 2.3. Let X,Y be any two n× n matrices such that the products XY and
Y X are Hermitian. Then, we have
‖XY ‖ = ‖Y X‖.
Proof. For any two n× n matrices X and Y , XY and Y X have the same eigen-
values; see, e.g., [5, Exercise I.3.7]. Therefore, ‖XY ‖ = λmax(XY ) = λmax(Y X) =
‖Y X‖.
A linear operator P such that P 2 = P and P ∗ = P is called an orthogonal
projector.
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Proposition 2.4. For two orthogonal projectors A and B, it holds that
‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖ .
Proof. We adapt a technique by Kittaneh [28] to our case. We define two 2× 2-
block matrices X and Y as
X :=
(
A B
0 0
)
and Y :=
(
A 0
B 0
)
and using A2 = A and B2 = B, we compute
XY :=
(
A+B 0
0 0
)
and Y X :=
(
A AB
BA B
)
=
(
A 0
0 B
)
+
(
0 AB
BA 0
)
.
As A and B are Hermitian, so are A+B, AB, BA, XY , and Y X. We use Lemma 2.3
and the triangle inequality to obtain∥∥∥∥
(
A+B 0
0 0
)∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥
(
A AB
BA B
)∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥
(
A 0
0 B
)∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥
(
0 AB
BA 0
)∥∥∥∥ .
Using the unitary invariance of the operator norm to permute the columns in the
rightmost matrix and the facts that ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = 1 as well as ‖AB‖ = ‖BA‖, we
conclude that ‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖.
3. Uncertainty relations. In this section, we prove a general uncertainty result
and derive from that a corollary that plays the crucial role in the security proof of
our protocols. The uncertainty result concerns the situation where the sender holds
an arbitrary quantum register of n qubits. He may measure them in either the +- or
the ×-basis. We are interested in the distribution of both these measurement results,
and we claim that they cannot both be “very far from uniform.”
3.1. History and previous work. The history of uncertainty relations starts
with Heisenberg, who showed that the outcomes of two noncommuting observables
A and B applied to any state ρ are not easy to predict simultaneously. However,
Heisenberg speaks only about the variance of the measurement results, and his result
was shown to have several shortcomings in [25, 18]. More general forms of uncer-
tainty relations were proposed in [6] and [18] to resolve these problems. The new
relations were called entropic uncertainty relations, because they are expressed using
Shannon entropy instead of the statistical variance. Entropic uncertainty relations
have the advantage of being pure information theoretic statements. The first entropic
uncertainty relation was introduced by Deutsch [18] and stated that
(3.1) H(P ) + H(Q) ≥ −2 log 1 + c
2
,
where P,Q are the distributions representing the measurement results and c is the
maximum inner product norm between any eigenvectors of A and B. First conjectured
by Kraus [29], Deutsch’s relation was improved by Maassen and Uffink [32] to the
optimal
(3.2) H(P ) + H(Q) ≥ −2 log c.
Although a bound on Shannon entropy can be helpful in some cases, it is usually
not good enough in cryptographic applications. The main tool to reduce the adver-
sary’s information—privacy amplification [4, 27, 3, 37, 36]—works only if a bound
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on the adversary’s min-entropy (in fact collision entropy) is known. Unfortunately,
knowing a lower bound on the Shannon entropy of a distribution does not in general
allow one to lower bound its higher order Re´nyi entropies.
An entropic uncertainty relation involving Re´nyi entropy of order 2 (i.e., collision
entropy) was introduced by Larsen [30, 40]. Larsen’s relation quantifies precisely
the collision entropy for the set {Ai}d+1i=1 of all maximally noncommuting observables,
where d is the dimension of the Hilbert space. Its use is therefore restricted to quantum
coding schemes that take advantage of all d+ 1 observables, i.e., to schemes that are
difficult to implement in practice.
3.2. Two mutually unbiased bases. In this section, we show that two distri-
butions obtained by measuring in two mutually unbiased bases cannot both be “very
far from uniform.” One way to express this is to say that a distribution is very non-
uniform if one can identify a subset of outcomes that has much higher probability
than for a uniform choice. Intuitively, the theorem below says that such sets cannot
be found for both measurements. In Appendix A, we generalize the results of this
section to more than two mutually unbiased bases.
Theorem 3.1. Let ρ be an arbitrary state of n qubits, and let Q+(·) and Q×(·)
be the respective distributions of the outcome when ρ is measured in the +-basis and
the ×-basis, respectively. Then, for any two sets L+ ⊂ {0, 1}n and L× ⊂ {0, 1}n it
holds that
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) ≤ 1 + 2−n/2
√
|L+||L×|.
Proof. We define the two orthogonal projectors
A :=
∑
x∈L+
|x〉〈x| and B :=
∑
y∈L×
H⊗n|y〉〈y|H⊗n.
Using the spectral decomposition of ρ =
∑
w λw|ϕw〉〈ϕw|, we have
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) = tr (Aρ) + tr (Bρ)
=
∑
w
λw (tr (A|ϕw〉〈ϕw|) + tr (B|ϕw〉〈ϕw|))
=
∑
w
λw (〈ϕw|A|ϕw〉+ 〈ϕw|B|ϕw〉)
=
∑
w
λw〈ϕw|(A+B)|ϕw〉
≤ ‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖,
where the last line is Proposition 2.4. In order to finish the proof, we show that
‖AB‖ ≤ 2−n/2√|L+||L×|. Note that an arbitrary state |ψ〉 = ∑z λzH⊗n|z〉 can be
expressed with coordinates λz in the diagonal basis. Then, with the sums over x and
y understood as over x ∈ L+ and y ∈ L×, respectively,
∥∥AB|ψ〉∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥
∑
x,y
|x〉〈x|H⊗n|y〉〈y|H⊗n|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ = 2−n/2
∥∥∥∥
∑
x,y
|x〉〈y|H⊗n|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
= 2−n/2
∥∥∥∥
∑
x
|x〉
∥∥∥∥
∣∣∣∣
∑
y
λy
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−n/2
√
|L+|
∑
y
|λy| ≤ 2−n/2
√
|L+||L×|.
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The second equality holds since |x〉 and H⊗n|y〉 are mutually unbiased, the first in-
equality follows from Pythagoras and the triangle inequality, and the last inequality
follows from Cauchy–Schwarz. This implies that ‖AB‖ ≤ 2−n/2√|L+||L×| and fin-
ishes the proof.
This theorem yields a meaningful bound as long as |L+| · |L×| < 2n, e.g., if L+
and L× both contain less than 2n/2 elements. The relation is tight in the sense that
for the Hadamard-invariant state
|ϕ〉 =
(
|0〉⊗n + (H|0〉)⊗n
)
/
√
2(1 + 2−n/2)
and L+ = L× = {0n}, it is straightforward to verify that Q+(L+) = Q×(L×) = (1 +
2−n/2)/2 and therefore Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) = 1 + 2−n/2. Another state that achieves
equality (for n even) is |ϕ〉 = |0〉⊗n/2⊗ (H|0〉)⊗n/2 with L+ = {0n/2x | x ∈ {0, 1}n/2}
and L× = {x0n/2 | x ∈ {0, 1}n/2}. We get that Q+(L+) = Q×(L×) = 1 and thus
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) = 2 = 1 + 2−n/2
√
2n.
If for r ∈ {+,×}, Lr contains only the n-bit string with the maximal probability
of Qr, we obtain a known tight relation (see inequality (9) in [32]).
Corollary 3.2. Let q+∞ and q
×
∞ be the maximal probabilities of the distributions
Q+ and Q× from above. It then holds that q+∞ · q×∞ ≤ 14 (1 + c)2, where c = 2−n/2.
Equality is achieved for the same state |ϕ〉 = (|0〉⊗n+(H|0〉)⊗n) /√2(1 + 2−n/2)
as above.
The following corollary plays a crucial role in the security proof of the OT protocol
in the next section.
Corollary 3.3. Let R be a random variable over {+,×}, and let X be the
outcome when ρ is measured in basis R, such that PX|R(x|r) = Qr(x). Then, for any
λ < 12 there exists an event E such that
P [E|R=+] + P [E|R=×] ≥ 1− negl(n)
and thus P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n) in case R is uniform, and such that
H∞(X|R=r, E) ≥ λn
for r ∈ {+,×} with PR|E(r) > 0.
Proof. Choose ε > 0 such that λ+ ε < 12 , define
S+ :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : Q+(x) ≤ 2−(λ+ε)n} and
S× :=
{
z ∈ {0, 1}n : Q×(z) ≤ 2−(λ+ε)n}
to be the sets of strings with small probabilities, and denote by L+ := S
+
and L× :=
S
×
their complements.2 Note that for all x ∈ L+, we have that Q+(x) > 2−(λ+ε)n
and therefore |L+| < 2(λ+ε)n. Analogously, we have |L×| < 2(λ+ε)n. For ease of
notation, we abbreviate the probabilities that strings with small probabilities occur
with q+ := Q+(S+) and q× := Q×(S×). It follows immediately from Theorem 3.1
that q+ + q× ≥ 1− negl(n).
We define E to be the event X ∈ SR. Then P [E|R=+] = P [X ∈ S+|R=+] = q+
and similarly P [E|R=×] = q×, and the first claim follows immediately. Furthermore,
2Here is the mnemonic: S for the strings with Small probabilities, L for Large.
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if R is uniformly distributed, then P [E ] = P [E|R=+]PR(+) + P [E|R=×]PR(×) =
1
2 (q
+ + q×) ≥ 12 − negl(n). Regarding the second claim, in case R = +, we have
H∞(X|R=+, E) = − log
(
max
x∈S+
Q+(x)
q+
)
≥ − log
(
2−(λ+ε)n
q+
)
= λn+ εn+ log(q+).
Thus, if q+ ≥ 2−εn, then indeed H∞(X|R=+, X ∈ S+) ≥ λn. The corresponding
holds for the case R = ×.
Finally, if q+ < 2−εn (or similarly q× < 2−εn), then instead of the above, we
define E as the empty event if R = + and as the event X ∈ S× if R = ×. It follows
that P [E|R = +] = 0 and P [E|R = ×] = q× ≥ 1 − negl(n), as well as H∞(X|R =
×, E) = H∞(X|R=×, X ∈ S×) ≥ λn+ εn+ log(q×) ≥ λn (for n large enough), both
by the bound on q+ + q× and on q+, whereas PR|E(+) = 0.
4. Rabin oblivious transfer.
4.1. The definition. A protocol for Rabin oblivious transfer (ROT) between
sender Alice and receiver Bob allows for Alice to send a bit b through an erasure chan-
nel to Bob. Each transmission delivers b or an erasure with probability 12 . Intuitively,
a protocol for ROT is secure if
(i) the sender Alice gets no information on whether b was received or not, no
matter what she does, and
(ii) the receiver Bob gets no information about b with probability at least 12 , no
matter what he does.
In this paper, we are considering quantum protocols for ROT. This means that while
the inputs and outputs of the honest senders are classical, described by random vari-
ables, the protocol may contain quantum computation and quantum communication,
and the view of a dishonest player is quantum and is thus described by a quantum
state.
Any such (two-party) protocol is specified by a family {(Sn,Rn)}n>0 of pairs of
interactive quantum circuits (i.e., interacting through a quantum channel). Each pair
is indexed by a security parameter n > 0, where Sn and Rn denote the circuits for
sender Alice and receiver Bob, respectively. In order to simplify the notation, we often
omit the index n, leaving the dependency on it implicit.
For the formal definition of the security requirements of a ROT protocol, let us
fix the following notation. Let B denote the binary random variable describing S’s
input bit b, and let A and Y denote the binary random variables describing R’s two
output bits, where the meaning is that A indicates whether the bit was received or
not. Furthermore, for a dishonest sender S˜, we have the ccq-state ρAY S˜, where (by
slight abuse of notation) we also denote by S˜ the quantum register that the sender
outputs. Its state may depend on A and Y . Similarly, for a dishonest receiver R˜, we
have the cq-state ρBR˜.
Definition 4.1. A (statistically) secure ROT is a two-party (quantum) protocol
(S,R) with the following properties.
Correctness: For honest S and R, P [B = Y |A = 1] ≥ 1− negl(n).
Receiver-security: For honest R and any dishonest S˜, there exists a binary random
variable B′ such that P [B′ = Y |A = 1] ≥ 1−negl(n) and δ(ρAB′S˜,1⊗ρB′S˜) ≤
negl(n).
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Sender-security: For any R˜, there exists an event E with P [E ] ≥ 12 −negl(n) such that
δ
(
ρBR˜|E , ρB ⊗ ρR˜|E
) ≤ negl(n).
If any of the negligible terms above equals 0, then the corresponding property is said
to hold perfectly. If one of the properties holds only with respect to a restricted class
S of S˜’s (resp., R of R˜’s), then this property is said to hold and the protocol is said
to be secure against S (resp., R).
Statistical receiver-security guarantees that the joint quantum state after the
execution of the protocol is, up to a negligible difference, the same as when the dis-
honest sender prepares the cq-state ρB′S˜, and gives the classical bit B
′ to an ideal
functionality which then passes it on to the receiver with probability 12 .
3 Statistical
sender-security guarantees that the joint quantum state is, up to a negligible differ-
ence, the same as when the dishonest receiver gets the sender’s bit B with probability
at most 12 and prepares the state ρR˜|E in case he does not receive it, and else the state
ρb
R˜|E¯ = ρR˜|B=b,E¯ if B = b. In other words, security guarantees that the dishonest party
cannot do more than when attacking an ideal functionality.
A formal treatment of the composability is beyond the scope of this paper. How-
ever, upcoming work of the authors implies that any quantum ROT protocol which
satisfies Definition 4.1 securely replaces an ideal ROT functionality when used se-
quentially in a purely classical protocol. We also refer to [43] for recent results about
the composition of quantum protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model.
4.2. The protocol. We introduce a quantum protocol for ROT that will be
shown to be perfectly receiver-secure (against any sender) and statistically sender-
secure against any quantum-memory-bounded receiver. Our protocol exhibits some
similarity to quantum conjugate coding introduced by Wiesner [44].
The protocol is very simple (see Figure 4.1): S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and sends
to R n qubits in either state |x〉+ or |x〉×, each chosen with probability 12 . R then
measures all received qubits either in the rectilinear or in the diagonal basis. With
probability 12 , R picks the right basis and gets x, while any R˜ that is forced to measure
part of the state (due to a memory bound) can have full information on x only in case
the +-basis was used or in case the ×-basis was used (but not in both cases). Privacy
amplification based on any two-universal class of hashing functions Fn is then used to
destroy partial information. (In order to avoid aborting, we specify that if a dishonest
S˜ refuses to participate or sends data in incorrect format, then R samples both of its
output bits a and y at random in {0, 1}.)
We first consider receiver-security.
Proposition 4.2. qot is perfectly receiver-secure.
It is obvious that no information about whether R has received the bit is leaked
to any sender S˜, since R does not send anything. However, one needs to show the
existence of a random variable B′ as required by receiver-security.
Proof. Recall that the density matrix ρAY S˜ is defined by the experiment where
the dishonest sender S˜ interacts with the honest memory-bounded R. Consider a
modification of the experiment where we allow R to be unbounded in memory and
where R waits to receive r and then measures all qubits in basis r. Let X ′ be the
3Note that the original definition given in [17] does not guarantee that the distribution of the
input bit is determined at the end of the execution of ROT. This is a strictly weaker definition and
does not fully capture what is expected from a ROT: it is easy to see that if the dishonest sender
can still influence his input bit after the execution of the protocol, then known schemes based on
ROT, such as bit commitments, are not secure anymore. The security definition given here is in the
spirit of the security definition from [16] for 1-2 OT.
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qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n, and r ∈R {+,×}.
2. S sends |ψ〉 := |x〉r to R (i.e., the string x in basis r).
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits of |ψ〉 in basis r′. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S announces r, f ∈R Fn, and e := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and y := e⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and y := 0.
Fig. 4.1. Protocol for quantum Rabin OT.
resulting string. Nevertheless, R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} at random and outputs (A, Y ) =
(0, 0) if r′ = r and (A, Y ) = (1, e ⊕ f(X ′)) if r′ = r. Since the only difference
between the two experiments is when R measures the qubits and in what basis R
measures them when r = r′, in which case his final output is independent of the
measurement outcome, the two experiments result in the same ρAY S˜. However, in
the modified experiment we can choose B′ to be e⊕ f(X ′) such that by construction
B′ = Y if A = 1 and A is uniformly distributed, independent of anything, and thus
ρAB′S˜ = 1⊗ ρB′S˜.
As we shall see in section 4.4, the security of the qot protocol against receivers
with bounded-size quantum memory holds as long as the bound applies before step 4
is reached. An equivalent protocol is obtained by purifying the sender’s actions.
Although qot is easy to implement, the purified or EPR-based version [23] depicted
in Figure 4.2 is easier to prove secure. A similar approach was taken in the Shor–
Preskill proof of security for the BB84 quantum key distribution scheme [41].
epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
2. S sends one half of each pair to R and keeps the other halves.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×} and measures all kept qubits in basis r. Let x ∈
{0, 1}n be the outcome. S announces r, f ∈R Fn, and e := b⊕ f(x).
5. R outputs a := 1 and y := e⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and y := 0.
Fig. 4.2. Protocol for EPR-based quantum Rabin OT.
Notice that while qot requires no quantum memory for honest players, quantum
memory for S seems to be required in epr-qot. The following lemma shows the strict
equivalence between qot and epr-qot.
Lemma 4.3. qot is sender-secure if and only if epr-qot is.
Proof. The proof follows easily after observing that S’s choices of r and f , to-
gether with the measurements, all commute with R˜’s actions. Therefore, they can be
performed right after step 1 with no change for R˜’s view. Modifying epr-qot that
way results in qot.
Note that for a dishonest receiver it is not only irrelevant whether he tries to
attack qot or epr-qot, but in fact there is no difference in the two protocols from
his point of view.
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4.3. Modeling dishonest receivers. We model dishonest receivers in qot,
respectively, epr-qot, under the assumption that the maximum size of their quantum
storage is bounded. These adversaries are required to have bounded quantum storage
only when they reach step 4 in (epr-)qot. Before that, the adversary can store and
carry out quantum computations involving any number of qubits. Apart from the
restriction on the size of the quantum memory available to the adversary, no other
assumption is made. In particular, the adversary is not assumed to be computationally
bounded, and the size of its classical memory is not restricted.
Definition 4.4. The set Rγ denotes all possible quantum dishonest receivers
{R˜n}n>0 in qot or epr-qot where for each n > 0, R˜n has quantum memory of size
at most γn when step 4 is reached.
In general, the adversary R˜ is allowed to perform any quantum computation
compressing the n qubits received from S into a quantum register M of size at most
γn when step 4 is reached. More precisely, the compression function is implemented
by some unitary transform C acting upon the quantum state received and an ancilla
of arbitrary size. The compression is performed by a measurement that we assume
in the computational basis without loss of generality. Before starting step 4, the
adversary first applies a unitary transform C:
2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗ C|x〉|0〉 → 2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗
∑
y
αx,y|ϕx,y〉M |y〉Y ,
where for all x,
∑
y |αx,y|2 = 1. Then, a measurement in the computational basis is
applied to register Y providing classical outcome y. The result is a quantum state
in register M of size γn qubits. Ignoring the value of y to ease the notation, the
renormalized state of the system in its most general form when step 4 in epr-qot is
reached is thus of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
αx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉M ,
where
∑
x |αx|2 = 1. We will prove security for any such state |ψ〉 and thus conditioned
on any value y that may be observed. It is therefore safe to leave the dependency on
y implicit.
4.4. Security against dishonest receivers. In this section, we show that epr-
qot is secure against any dishonest receiver having access to a quantum storage device
of size strictly smaller than half the number of qubits received at step 2.
Theorem 4.5. For all γ < 12 , qot is statistically secure against Rγ .
Proof. After Lemmas 4.3 and 4.2, it remains to show that epr-qot is sender-
secure against Rγ . Since γ <
1
2 , we can find ε > 0 with γ+ε <
1
2 . Consider a dishonest
receiver R˜ in epr-qot with quantum memory of size γn. Let R and X denote the
random variables describing the basis r and the outcome x of S’s measurement (in
basis r) in step 4 of epr-qot, respectively. We implicitly understand the distribution
of X given R to be conditioned on the classical outcome y of the measurement R˜
performed when the memory bound applies, as described in section 4.3; the following
analysis works no matter what y is. Corollary 3.3 with λ = γ+ε implies the existence
of an event E such that P [E ] ≥ 12−negl(n) and such that H∞(X|R=r, E) ≥ γn+εn for
any relevant r. Note that by construction, the random variables X and R, and thus
also the event E , are independent of the sender’s input bit B, and hence ρB|E = ρB .
It remains to show that δ(ρBR˜|E , ρB|E⊗ρR˜|E) ≤ negl(n). As the bit B is masked by the
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output of the hash function F (X) in step 4 of epr-qot (where the random variable F
represents the random choice for f), it suffices to show that F (X) is close to uniform
and essentially independent from R˜’s view, conditioned on E . But this is guaranteed
by the above bound on H∞(X|R=r, E) and by Theorem 2.1.
4.5. On the necessity of privacy amplification. In this section, we show
that randomized privacy amplification is needed for protocol qot to be secure. For
instance, it is tempting to believe that the sender could use the XOR
⊕
i xi in order
to mask the bit b, rather than f(x) for a randomly sampled f ∈ Fn. This would
reduce the communication complexity as well as the number of random coins needed.
However, we argue in this section that this is not secure (against an adversary as we
model it). Indeed, somewhat surprisingly, this variant can be broken by a dishonest
receiver that has no quantum memory at all (but that can do coherent measurements
on pairs of qubits) in the case n is even. For odd n, the dishonest receiver needs to
store a single qubit.
Clearly, a dishonest receiver can break the modified scheme qot and learn the
bit b with probability 1 if he can compute
⊕
i xi with probability 1. Note that, using
the equivalence between qot and epr-qot, xi can be understood as the outcome of
the measurement in either the +- or the ×-basis, performed by the sender on one
part of an EPR pair while the other has been handed over to the receiver. The
following proposition shows that indeed the receiver can learn
⊕
i xi by a suitable
measurement of his parts of the EPR pairs. Concretely, he measures the qubits he
receives pairwise by a suitable measurement which allows him to learn the XOR of
the two corresponding xi’s, no matter what the basis is (and he needs to store one
single qubit in case n is odd). This obviously allows him to learn the XOR of all xi’s
in all cases.
Proposition 4.6. Consider two EPR pairs, i.e., |ψ〉 = 12
∑
x |x〉S |x〉R, where x
ranges over {0, 1}2. Let r ∈ {+,×}, and let x1 and x2 be the result when measuring
the two qubits in register S in basis r. There exists a fixed measurement for register
R so that the outcome together with r uniquely determines x1 ⊕ x2.
Proof. The measurement that does the job is the Bell measurement, i.e., the
measurement in the Bell basis {|Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ−〉}. Recall that
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ + |11〉+) = 1√2
(|00〉× + |11〉×),
∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ + |10〉+) = 1√2
(|00〉× − |11〉×),
∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ − |11〉+) = 1√2
(|01〉× + |10〉×),
∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ − |10〉+) = 1√2
(|10〉× − |01〉×) .
Due to the special form of the Bell basis, when register R is measured and, as a
consequence, one of the four Bell states is observed, the state in register S collapses
to that same Bell state. Indeed, when doing the basis transformation, all cross-
products cancel each other out. It now follows by inspection that knowledge of the
Bell state and the basis r allows one to predict the XOR of the two bits observed
when measuring the Bell state in basis r. For instance, for the Bell state |Ψ+〉, the
XOR is 1 if r = + and 0 if r = ×.
Note that from the above proof one can see that the receiver’s attack (resp., his
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measurement on each pair of qubits) can be understood as teleporting one of the
two entangled qubits from the receiver to the sender using the other as EPR pair.
However, the receiver does not send the outcome of his measurement to the sender,
but keeps it in order to predict the XOR.
Clearly, the same strategy also works against any fixed linear function. Therefore,
the only hope for doing deterministic privacy amplification is by using a nonlinear
function. However, it has been shown recently in [1] that this approach is also doomed
to fail in our scenario, because the outcome of any Boolean function can be perfectly
predicted by a dishonest receiver who can store a single qubit and later learns the
correct basis r ∈ {+,×}.
4.6. Weakening the assumptions. Observe that qot requires error-free quan-
tum communication, in that a transmitted bit b that is encoded by the sender and
measured by the receiver using the same basis is always received as b. In addition, it
also requires a perfect quantum source which on request produces one and only one
qubit in the right state, e.g., one photon with the right polarization. Indeed, in case
of noisy quantum communication, an honest receiver in qot is likely to receive an
incorrect bit, and the sender-security of qot is vulnerable to imperfect sources that
once in a while transmit more than one qubit in the same state: a malicious receiver
R˜ can easily determine the basis r ∈ {+,×} and measure all the following qubits
in the right basis. However, current technology only allows one to approximate the
behavior of single-photon sources and noise-free quantum communication. It would
be preferable to find a variant of qot that allows one to weaken the technological
requirements put upon the honest parties.
In this section, we present such a protocol based on BB84 states [2], bb84-qot (see
Figure 4.3). The security proof follows essentially by adapting the security analysis
of qot in a rather straightforward way, as will be discussed later.
Let us consider a quantum channel with an error probability φ < 12 ; i.e., φ denotes
the probability that a transmitted bit b that is encoded by the sender and measured
by the receiver using the same basis is received as 1− b. For the sake of simplicity we
assume that the error rate is the same for qubits encoded in the +- and ×-basis. It is
straightforward to adapt the analysis below to basis-dependent error rates. In order
to not have the security rely on any level of noise, we assume the error probability to
be zero when considering a dishonest receiver. Also, let us consider a quantum source
which produces two or more qubits (in the same state), rather than just one, with
probability η < 1 − φ. We assume that the parameters φ and η which describe the
precision of the physical apparatus being used are known to the players.
We call this the (φ, η)-weak quantum model. By adjusting the parameters, this
model can also cope with dark counts and empty pulses; see section 6.1.
In order to deal with noisy quantum communication, we need to do error-correction
without giving the adversary too much information. Techniques for solving this prob-
lem are known as information reconciliation (e.g., [9]) or as secure sketches [20]. Let
x ∈ {0, 1} be an arbitrary string, and let x′ ∈ {0, 1} be the result of flipping every bit
in x (independently) with probability φ. It is well known that learning the syndrome
S(x) of x, with respect to a suitable efficiently decodable linear error-correcting code
C of length , allows us to recover x from x′, except with negligible probability in 
(e.g., [33, 12, 20]). Furthermore, it is known from coding theory that, for large enough
, such a code can be chosen with rate R arbitrarily close to but smaller than 1−h(φ),
i.e., such that the syndrome length s is bounded by s < (h(φ)+ ε), where ε > 0 (see,
e.g., [12] or the full version of [20] and the references therein).
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Regarding the loss of information, we can analyze privacy amplification in a simi-
lar way as before, just by appending a register for the syndrome S(x) to the quantum
register E. Using that S0(ρS(X)E) ≤ q + s, Theorem 2.1 then reads
(4.1) δ
(
ρF (X)FS(X)E,1⊗ ρFS(X)E
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2 (H∞(X)−q−s−1).
Consider the protocol bb84-qot in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model shown in
Figure 4.3. The protocol uses an efficiently decodable linear code C, parametrized
in  ∈ N, with codeword length , rate R = 1 − h(φ) − ε for some small ε > 0,
and the ability to correct errors occurring with probability φ (except with negligible
probability). Let S be the corresponding syndrome function. As before, the memory
bound in bb84-qot applies before step 4.
bb84-qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n.
2. S sends xi in the corresponding bases |x1〉θ1 , . . . , |xn〉θn to R.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits in basis r′. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n
be the result.
4. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, sets I := {i : θi = {+,×}[r]} and  := |I|, and
announces r, I, syn := S(x|I), f ∈R F, and e := b⊕ f(x|I).
5. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a := 1 and b′ := e⊕f(x|I)
if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Fig. 4.3. Protocol for the BB84 version of quantum Rabin OT.
By the abovementioned properties of the code C, it is obvious that R receives
the correct bit b if r′ = r, except with negligible probability. (The error probability
is negligible in , but by Bernstein’s law of large numbers,  is linear in n except with
negligible probability.) Also, since there is no communication from R to S, a dishonest
sender S˜ cannot learn whether R received the bit. In fact, bb84-qot can be shown
to be perfectly receiver-secure in the same way as in Proposition 4.2. In a manner
similar to that for protocol qot, in order to argue about sender-security we compare
bb84-qot with a purified version shown in Figure 4.4. bb84-epr-qot runs in the
(φ, 0)-weak quantum model, and the imperfectness of the quantum source assumed in
bb84-qot is simulated by S in bb84-epr-qot so that there is no difference from R’s
point of view.
The security equivalence between bb84-qot (in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model)
and bb84-epr-qot (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model) is omitted here as it follows
essentially along the same lines as in section 4.2.
Theorem 4.7. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, bb84-qot is statistically se-
cure against Rγ for any γ <
1−η
4 − h(φ)2 (if parameter ε is chosen small enough).
Proof sketch. It remains to show that bb84-epr-qot is statistically sender-secure
against Rγ (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model). The reasoning goes exactly along
the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.5, except that we restrict our attention to those
i’s which are in J . By Bernstein’s law of large numbers,  lies within (1± ε)n/2 and
|J | within (1 − η ± ε)n/2 except with negligible probability. In order to make the
proof easier to read, we assume that  = n/2 and |J | = (1− η)n/2 and also treat the
ε occurring in the rate of the code C as zero. For the full proof, we simply need to
carry the ε’s along and then choose them small enough at the end of the proof.
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bb84-epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). Additionally,
S initializes I ′+ := ∅ and I ′× := ∅.
2. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, S does the following. With probability 1− η, S
sends one half of the ith pair to R and keeps the other half. While with
probability η, S picks θi ∈R {+,×}, replaces I ′θi by I ′θi ∪ {i}, and sends
two or more qubits in the same state |xi〉θi to R, where xi ∈R {0, 1}.
3. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. S picks a random index set J ⊂R {1, . . . , n} \ (I ′+ ∪ I ′×). Then, it picks
r ∈R {+,×}, sets I := J ∪ I ′r and  := |I|, and for each i ∈ J measures
the corresponding qubit in basis r. Let xi be the corresponding outcome,
and let x|I be the collection of all xi’s with i ∈ I. S announces r, I,
syn = S(x|I), f ∈R F, and e = b⊕ f(x|I).
5. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a := 1 and b′ := e⊕f(x|I),
if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Fig. 4.4. Protocol for EPR-based quantum Rabin OT, BB84 version.
Write n′ = |J | = (1 − η)n/2, and let γ′ be such that γn = γ′n′, i.e., γ′ =
2γ/(1− η). Assume κ > 0 such that γ′ + κ < 12 , where we make sure later that such
κ exists. It then follows from Corollary 3.3 that there exists an event E such that
P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n′) = 12 − negl(n) and
H∞
(
X|J
∣∣R=r, E) ≥ (γ′ + κ)n′ = γn+ κ(1− η)n/2 .
By (4.1), it remains to argue that this is larger than q + s = γn+ h(φ)n/2; i.e.,
κ(1− η) > h(φ) ,
where κ has to satisfy
κ <
1
2
− γ′ = 1
2
− 2
γ/(1− η) .
This can obviously be achieved (by choosing κ appropriately) if and only if the claimed
bound on γ holds.
5. Quantum commitment scheme. In this section, we present a BC scheme
from a committer C with bounded quantum memory to an unbounded receiver V.
The scheme is peculiar since in order to commit to a bit, the committer does not
send anything. During the committing stage information goes only from V to C. The
security analysis of the scheme uses similar techniques as the analysis of epr-qot.
5.1. The protocol. The objective of this section is to present a bounded-
quantum-memory BC scheme comm (see Figure 5.1). Intuitively, a commitment
to a bit b is made by measuring random BB84-states in basis {+,×}[b].
It is clear that epr-comm is hiding, i.e., that the commit phase reveals no infor-
mation on the committed bit, since no information is transmitted to V at all. Hence
we have the following lemma.
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comm(b):
1. V picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and r ∈R {+,×}n.
2. V sends xi in the corresponding bases |x1〉r1 , |x2〉r2 , . . . , |xn〉rn to C.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all qubits in basis {+,×}[b]. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V verifies that xi = x
′
i for those i where ri = {+,×}[b]. V accepts if and
only if this is the case.
Fig. 5.1. Protocol for quantum commitment.
Lemma 5.1. epr-comm is perfectly hiding.
As for the OT-protocol of section 4.2, we present an equivalent EPR-version of
the protocol that is easier to analyze (see Figure 5.2).
epr-comm(b):
1. V prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉).
2. V sends one half of each pair to C and keeps the other halves.
3. C commits to the bit b by measuring all received qubits in basis {+,×}[b].
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
4. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
5. V measures all his qubits in basis {+,×}[b] and obtains x ∈ {0, 1}n. He
chooses a random subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. V verifies that xi = x′i for all
i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the case.
Fig. 5.2. Protocol for EPR-based quantum commitment.
Lemma 5.2. comm is secure against dishonest C˜ if and only if epr-comm is.
Proof. The proof uses similar reasoning as the proof of Lemma 4.3. First, it
clearly makes no difference if we change step 5 to the following:
5′. V chooses the subset I, measures all qubits with index in I in basis {+,×}[b]
and all qubits not in I in basis {+,×}[1−b]. V verifies that xi = x′i for all
i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the case.
Finally, we can observe that the view of C˜ does not change if V would have done his
choice of I and his measurement already in step 1. Doing the measurements at this
point means that the qubits to be sent to C˜ collapse to a state that is distributed
identically to the state prepared in the original scheme. The EPR-version is therefore
equivalent to the original commitment scheme from C˜’s point of view.
5.2. Modeling dishonest committers. A dishonest committer C˜ with bound-
ed memory of at most γn qubits in epr-comm can be modeled very similarly to the
dishonest OT-receiver R˜ from section 4.3: C˜ consists first of a circuit acting on all n
qubits received, then of a measurement of all but at most γn qubits, and finally of
a circuit that takes the following input: a bit b that C˜ will attempt to open, the γn
qubits in memory, and some ancilla in a fixed state. The output is a string x′ ∈ {0, 1}n
to be sent to V at the opening stage.
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Definition 5.3. We define Cγ to be the class of all committers {C˜n}n>0 in
comm or epr-comm that, at the start of the opening phase (i.e., at step 4), have a
quantum memory of size at most γn qubits.
We adopt the binding condition for quantum BC from [21].
Definition 5.4. A (quantum) BC scheme is (statistically) binding against C
if for all {C˜n}n>0 ∈ C, the probability pb(n) that C˜n opens b ∈ {0, 1} with success
satisfies
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n).
In the next section, we show that epr-comm is binding against Cγ for any γ <
1
2 .
Note that the binding condition given here in Definition 5.4 is weaker than the
classical one, where one would require that a bit b exists such that pb(n) is negligible.
For a general quantum adversary who can always commit to 0 and 1 in superposition,
however, this is too strong a requirement; thus, it is typically argued that Definition 5.4
is the best one can hope for. In upcoming work [16], though, we show that one
can ask for a stronger binding property, and in fact protocol comm proposed here
does satisfy a stronger binding property (but for a smaller bound on the committer’s
quantum memory). While the weaker condition is sufficient for many applications,
the stronger one seems to be necessary in some cases. For instance, intuitively, comm
can easily be transformed into a string commitment scheme simply by committing
bitwise, but in order to prove this string commitment secure, it is necessary that
comm is secure with respect to the stronger security definition. However, proving
comm secure with respect to the stronger binding condition requires quite different
techniques, and therefore we settle here for the weaker version and refer the interested
reader to [16].
5.3. Security proof of the commitment scheme. Note that the first three
steps of epr-qot and epr-comm (i.e., before the memory bound applies) are exactly
the same! This allows us to reuse Corollary 3.3 and the analysis of section 4.4 to
prove the binding property of epr-comm.
Theorem 5.5. For any γ < 12 , comm is perfectly hiding and statistically binding
against Cγ .
Proof. It remains to show that epr-comm is binding against Cγ . Let ε, δ > 0
be such that γ + 2h(δ) + 2ε < 1/2, where h is the binary entropy function. Recall
that Bδn ≤ 2h(δ)n. Let R be the basis, determined by the bit that C˜ claims in
step 4, in which V measures the quantum state in step 5, and let X be the outcome.
Corollary 3.3 implies the existence of an event E such that P [E|R=+]+P [E|R=×] ≥
1− negl(n) and H∞(X|R=r, E) ≥ (γ+2h(δ)+ 2ε)n. Applying Lemma 2.2, it follows
that any guess Xˆ for X satisfies
P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X) |R=r, E] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X|X∈S+)−γn−1)+log(Bδn) ≤ 2−εn+ 12 .
However, if Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X), then sampling a random subset of the positions will detect
an error except with probability at most 2−δn. Hence, writing q+ := P [E|R=+] and
q× := P [E|R=×],
p0(n) ≤ (1− q+) + q+ · (2−εn+ 12 + 2−δn) ≤ 1− q+ + negl(n),
and analogously p1(n) ≤ 1− q× + negl(n). We conclude that
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 2− q+ − q× + negl(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n) .
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5.4. Weakening the assumptions. As argued earlier, assuming that a party
can produce single qubits (with probability 1) is not reasonable given current technol-
ogy. Also the assumption that there is no noise on the quantum channel is impractical.
It can be shown that a straightforward modification of comm remains secure in the
(φ, η)-weak quantum model as introduced in section 4.6 (see also section 6.1), with
φ < 12 and η < 1− φ.
Let comm′ be the modification of comm where in step 5 V accepts if and only if
xi = x
′
i for all but about a φ-fraction of the i, where ri = {+,×}[b]. More precisely,
for all but a (φ+ ε)-fraction, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
Theorem 5.6. In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, comm′ is perfectly hiding and
is binding against Cγ for any γ satisfying γ <
1
2 (1− η)− 2h(φ).
Proof sketch. Using Bernstein’s law of large numbers, one can argue that for
honest C and V, the opening of a commitment is accepted except with negligible
probability. The hiding property holds using the same reasoning as in Lemma 5.1.
And the binding property can be argued essentially along the lines of Theorem 5.5,
with the following modifications. Let J denote the set of indices i where V succeeds
in sending a single qubit. We restrict the analysis to those i’s which are in J . By
Bernstein’s law of large numbers, the cardinality of J is about (1 − η)n (meaning
within (1 − η ± ε)n), except with negligible probability. Thus, restricting to these
i’s has the same effect as replacing γ by γ/(1 − η) (neglecting the ±ε to simplify
notation). Assuming that C˜ knows every xi for i ∈ J , for all xi’s with i ∈ J he has to
be able to guess all but about a φ/(1− η)-fraction correctly, in order to be successful
in the opening. However, C˜ succeeds with only negligible probability if
φ/(1− η) < δ .
Additionally, δ must be such that
γ
1− η + 2h(δ) <
1
2
.
δ can be chosen that way if
2h
(
φ
1− η
)
+
γ
1− η <
1
2
.
Using the fact that h(νp) ≤ νh(p) for any ν ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 such that νp ≤ 1, this
is clearly satisfied if 2h(φ) + γ < 12 (1− η).
6. Towards practice. In the following two sections, we elaborate on the ques-
tion of how close to practice our systems are. First, we argue that imperfections oc-
curring in practice like dark counts and empty pulses are covered by our (φ, η)-weak
quantum model used in sections 4.6 and 5.6. Second, we sketch how our techniques
can be extended to the more realistic setting of noisy quantum memory.
6.1. More imperfections. In practice, quantum transmissions are subject to
other imperfections: dark counts and empty pulses. Dark counts occur due to thermal
fluctuation in the detector hardware which results in detection even though no qubit
was received. Dark counts contribute to the error rate (i.e., each dark count accounts
for a bit error with probability 12 ) of the channel. This imperfection can therefore be
included in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model by an appropriate choice of parameter φ
without the need for any further modification.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
CRYPTOGRAPHY IN THE BOUNDED-QUANTUM-STORAGE MODEL 1885
Empty pulses occur in two cases: when the quantum channel lets a transmitted
qubit escape (or when it is absorbed) and when the source does not produce any qubit
for a given time slot. The latter is unavoidable for sources using weak coherent pulses
as is the case in most experimental settings. Weak coherent pulses approximate a
single-qubit source by producing on average only a small fraction of one qubit per
pulse. It means that although most of the pulses are empty, the probability for a
multiqubit pulse is very small. In this case, the receiver must report to the sender
the positions of all pulses detected. Assuming the honest sender knows a tight upper
bound on the rate at which the source produces empty pulses, the adversary can
only take advantage of empty pulses caused by absorption in the fiber. The best
the adversary can do is to substitute the fiber for one that preserves all qubits sent
and to report empty pulses when a single pulse has been received. The effect is
to increase the rate at which multiqubit pulses occur. This attack is known as the
photon number splitting attack [7, 8, 26] in quantum key distribution applications. It
follows that empty pulses can also be included in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model by
an appropriate adjustment of parameter η.
Assume that a practical implementation of bb84-qot or comm takes place in a
setting where φx is the probability for a bit error caused by the channel, φdc is the
probability for a dark count, ηmq is the probability for a multiqubit transmission, and
ηab is the probability for an empty pulse caused by absorption. These parameters are
defined under the condition that the source is sending out a signal. It follows that if
bb84-qot and comm are secure in the (φx +
φdc
2 ,
ηmq
1−ηab )-weak quantum model, then
their implementation is also secure provided that it is accurately modeled by these
four parameters.
A variety of imperfections specific to particular implementations can be adapted
to the weak quantum model in a similar way.
6.2. Generalizing the memory model. The bounded-quantum-storage model
limits the number of physical qubits the adversary’s memory can contain. A more
realistic model would rather address the noise process which the adversary’s memory
undergoes. For instance, it is not hard to build a very large but unreliable memory
device containing a large number of qubits. It is reasonable to expect that our pro-
tocols remain secure also in a scenario where the adversary’s memory is of arbitrary
size, but where some quantum operation (modeling noise) is applied to it. Inequality
(2.2) of the privacy amplification theorem, Theorem 2.1, allows us to apply our con-
structions to slightly more general memory models. In particular, all our protocols
that are secure against adversaries with memory of no more than γn qubits are also
secure against any noise model that reduces the rank of the mixed state ρE, held by
the adversary, to at most 2γn.
An example of a noise process resulting in a reduction of H0(ρE) is an erasure
channel. Assuming the n initial qubits are each erased with probability larger than
1−γ when the memory bound applies, it holds except with negligible probability in n
that H0(ρE) < γn. The same applies if the noise process is modeled by a depolarizing
channel with error probability p = 1 − γ. Such a depolarizing channel replaces each
qubit by a random one with probability p and does nothing with probability 1− p.
The technique we have developed does not allow us to deal with depolarizing
channels with p < 1−γ although one would expect that some 0 < p < 1−γ should be
sufficient to ensure security against such adversaries. The reason for this is that not
knowing the positions where the errors occurred should make it more difficult for the
adversary than when the noise process is modeled by an erasure channel. However,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
1886 I. B. DAMGA˚RD, S. FEHR, L. SALVAIL, AND C. SCHAFFNER
it seems that our uncertainty relations (i.e., Theorems 3.1 and A.3) are not strong
enough to address this case. Generalizing the bounded-quantum-storage model to
more realistic noisy-memory models is an interesting open question.
7. Conclusion, further research, and open problems. We have shown how
to construct ROT and BC securely in the bounded-quantum-storage model. Our
protocols require no quantum memory for honest players and remain secure provided
the adversary has access to only quantum memory of size bounded by a large fraction
of all qubits transmitted. Such a gap between the amount of storage required for
honest players and adversaries is not achievable by classical means. All our protocols
are noninteractive and can be implemented using current technology.
In this paper, we considered ROT of only one bit per invocation. Our technique
can easily be extended to deal with string ROT, essentially by using a class of two-
universal functions with range {0, 1}n rather than {0, 1}, for some  with γ +  < 12
(resp., < 1−η4 − h(φ)2 for bb84-qot).
Although other flavors of OTs can be constructed from ROT using standard
reductions, a more direct approach would give a better ratio between storage bound
and communication complexity. Recent extensions have shown that a 1-2 OT protocol
built along the lines of bb84-qot is secure against adversaries with bounded quantum
memory [16]. Interestingly, the techniques used are quite different from the ones of
this paper (which appear to fail in the case of 1-2 OT), and they additionally allow
us to analyze and prove secure the BC scheme comm with respect to the stronger
security definition, as briefly discussed in section 5.2.
A main open problem is the optimality of the bound on the adversary’s quantum
memory. The protocol qot for instance, appears to be secure against any adversary
with memory less than n qubits, but our analysis requires the memory to be smaller
than n/2. Also, finding protocols secure against adversaries in more general noisy-
memory models, briefly discussed in section 6.2, would certainly be a natural and
interesting extension of this work to more practical settings.
Appendix A. Uncertainty relation for more mutually unbiased bases.
In this appendix, we generalize the uncertainty relations derived in section 3 to more
than two mutually unbiased bases. Such uncertainty relations over more but not all
mutually unbiased bases in terms of min-entropy may be of independent interest; see
the discussion at the end of section 3.1.
First, we generalize Proposition 2.4 to more projectors.
Proposition A.1. For orthogonal projectors A0, A1, A2, . . . , AM , it holds that
(A.1)
∥∥∥∥∥
M∑
i=0
Ai
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1 +M · max0≤i<j≤M ‖AiAj‖.
Proof. Defining
X :=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
A0 A1 · · · AM
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ and Y :=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
A0 0 · · · 0
A1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
AM 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
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yields
XY =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
A0 +A1 + . . .+AM 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ and
Y X =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
A0 A0A1 · · · A0AM
A1A0 A1 · · · A1AM
...
...
. . .
...
AMA0 AMA1 · · · AM
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
The matrix Y X can be additively decomposed into M + 1 matrices according to the
following pattern:
Y X =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∗
∗
. . .
∗
∗
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 ∗
0
. . .
. . .
0 ∗
∗ 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
+ · · · +
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 ∗
∗ 0
. . .
. . .
0
∗ 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
where the ∗’s stand for entries of Y X and for i = 0, . . . ,M the ith star pattern after
the diagonal pattern is obtained by i cyclic shifts of the columns of the diagonal
pattern.
As in the proof of Proposition 2.4, XY and Y X are Hermitian, and we use
Lemma 2.3, the triangle inequality, the unitary invariance of the operator norm, and
the fact that for all i = j : ‖Ai‖ = 1 and ‖AiAj‖ = ‖AjAi‖ to obtain the desired
statement (A.1).
Definition A.2. Sets B0,B1, . . . ,BM of bases of the complex Hilbert space C2n
are called mutually unbiased if for all i = j ∈ {0, . . . ,M}, it holds that
∀|ϕ〉 ∈ Bi, ∀|ψ〉 ∈ Bj : |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2 = 2−n.
Theorem A.3. Let the density matrix ρ describe the state of n qubits, and let
B0,B1, . . . ,BM be mutually unbiased bases of C2n . Let Q0(·), Q1(·), . . . , QM (·) be the
distributions of the outcome when ρ is measured in bases B0,B1, . . . ,BM , respectively.
Then, for any sets L0, L1, . . . , LM ⊂ {0, 1}n, it holds that
M∑
i=0
Qi(Li) ≤ 1 +M · 2−n/2 max
0≤i<j≤M
√
|Li||Lj |.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.1.
Analogous to Corollary 3.2, we derive an uncertainty relation about the sum of
the min-entropies of up to 2n/2 distributions.
Corollary A.4. For an ε > 0, let 0 < M < 2
n
2−εn. For i = 0, . . . ,M , let Hi∞
be the min-entropies of the distributions Qi from the theorem above. Then,
M∑
i=0
Hi∞ ≥ (M + 1)
(
log(M + 1)− negl(n)).
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Proof. For i = 0, . . . ,M , we denote by qi∞ the maximal probability of Q
i and let
Li be the set containing only the n-bit string x with this maximal probability qi∞.
Theorem A.3 together with the assumption about M assures
∑M
i=0 q
i
∞ ≤ 1+ negl(n).
By the inequality of the geometric and arithmetic mean it follows that
M∑
i=0
Hi∞ = − log
M∏
i=0
qi∞ ≥ − log
(
1 + negl(n)
M + 1
)M+1
= (M + 1)
(
log(M + 1)− negl(n)).
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